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For the last decade and more Noam Chomsky has been elaborating a skein of 
doctrines about language learning, linguistic universals, Empiricism and innate 
cognitive mechanisms. 1 My aim in this paper is to pull apart some of the 
claims that Chomsky often defends collectively. In particular, I want to 
dissect out some contentions about the existence of linguistic universals. I 
shall argue that these claims, while they may be true, are logically indepen- 
dent from a cluster of claims Chomsky makes about Empiricism, language 
learning and innate cognitive mechanisms. The latter claims are, on my view, 
significantly more plausible than the former. Failure to note the logical space 
between the two has had lamentable consequences both for Chomsky and for 
his critics. Chomsky has been rather too ready to accept the existence of 
linguistic universals, and in arguing that one or another specific feature of a 
grammar is universal, he has consistently invoked an argument form of 
dubious merit. The critics, for their part, have sometimes argued against 
Chomsky's attack on Empiricist learning theories by criticizing Chomsky's 
views on language universals. If, as I shall maintain, the two positions are 
quite independent, then the critics' skepticism about linguistic universals 
is largely irrelevant to the Chomskian critique of Empiricist theories of 
learning. 
To begin, let me sketch those parts of Chomsky's view that I take to be 
most plausible. The matter at hand is language acquisition and the cognitive 
mechanisms that underlie it. What is it that happens when a child learns her 
first language? According to Chomsky, she comes to know, albeit tacitly, 
the rules of  the grammar of her language. A number of philosophers, myself 
among them, have badgered Chomsky about this way of viewing language 
learning. 2 In what follows, however, I propose to ignore those objections 
and adopt Chomsky's view that in acquiring her first language a child 
internally represents a grammar of her language, or, what is essentially 
the same view, that she comes to tacitly know the rules of her grammar. 
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Granting this view of language learning, what can we say about the 
psychological mechanisms that are responsible for the child's feat? It could 
hardly be denied that for learning to be possible the child must come to the 
task already equipped with some innate learning mechanism. 3 But agreement 
on this point leaves plenty of room for disagreement. Perhaps the most 
exciting question in dispute is this: Could 'Empiricist' mechanisms - the sorts 
of mechanisms characteristic of Empiricist theories of  mind and learning - 
possibly be sufficient to explain the process of language acquisition; or must 
we instead posit some very different sort of mechanism, one which is more 
Rationalist in cast? Chomsky, of course, holds that an Empiricist learning 
theory cannot account for language learning. 4 
There is, in Chomsky's writings, a variety of arguments aimed at estab- 
lishing the inadequacy of Empiricist learning theories. By my lights, the 
most persuasive of these are the various versions of what might be called the 
rational scientist argument. In outline, the argument goes like this: Suppose 
an empirical investigator were to be set the task of duplicating the child's 
achievement. The investigator is given all the data available to the child 
during language acquisition, and only those data. The investigator is assumed 
to have no explicit knowledge about universal features of human language, if 
such there be. Would such an investigator be able to discover the grammar of 
the language to which the child is exposed? The issue, of course, is not 
whether the investigator might be able to fortuitously think up the correct 
grammar, but rather whether he would be able to be tolerably sure that he 
had the right one, given the evidence available. The answer, Chomsky con- 
tends, is no. For there are indefinitely many grammars all compatible with 
the evidence our imagined investigator has available, yet significantly dif- 
ferent from each other. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the 
correct grammar will be simpler than its competitors on any intuitive, non- 
question begging account of  simplicity. So the investigator would not be able 
to infer from the evidence the child has available to the grammar the child in 
fact acquires. Now to tie this conclusion to the attack on Empiricism we need 
only note that our rational investigator presumably has available to him all 
the inferential apparatus compatible with Empiricist theories of learning, and 
indeed he has a bit more.S So if he cannot infer from data to grammar, no 
Empiricist acquisition mechanism can duplicate the child's trick of coming 
up with the correct grammar on the basis of the data available. 
The rational scientist argument, it need hardly be said, is a topic of 
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considerable controversy. My own view is that, though it plainly needs much 
elaboration, the argument as sketched is the core of a very persuasive case 
against the adequacy of Empiricist language acquisition devices. However, it 
is no part of my current project to defend the rational scientist argument. I 
want to quarrel with Chomsky, not to praise him. So let us agree, even if only 
for argument's sake, that Comsky has shown the correct language acquisition 
theory will be a non-Empiricist theory. The quarrel I have with Comsky is 
that he thinks he has shown quite a bit more. Chomsky has long advocated 
the view that the correct language acquisition theory will be a non-Empiricist 
theory of a very special kind. So special, indeed, that if he is right, then the 
existence of linguistic universals follows straightforwardly. The burden of 
my argument is that there is neither evidence nor argument in favor of the 
view that the correct acquisition theory must be of this very special sort. 
Such argument as we are given would at most establish that the right acquisi- 
tion theory is a non-Empiricist one. My hunch is that Chomsky has simply 
failed to note the diversity possible in non-Empiricist acquisition theories, 
and thus has failed to see the gap between the defended view that a correct 
acquisition theory will be non-Empiricist, and the undefended view that it 
will be the kind of theory which entails the existence of linguistic universals. 
The first step in making my case is to underscore the potential for diversity 
in non-Empiricist theory of language acquisition. To this end I will sketch 
four categories of acquisition theory. The theories in each category plainly 
attribute more to the mind, by way of innate endowment, than would any 
theory that might comfortably be called Empiricist. 
Type I. Theories in this group explain language acquisition by main- 
taining that all the details of the grammar the child will come to know, and 
only the details of that grammar, are already internally represented in the 
infant at birth. Time is needed for the innately programmed grammar to be 
properly utilized, thus the child does not speak at birth. But the process of 
'learning to speak' is simply a maturational process, like puberty or the 
growth of teeth. Theories which attempt to account for language learning in 
this way have the modest virtue of being unquestionably false. For it is plain 
that the child's external environment during the time she passes from non- 
speaker to speaker is not as irrelevant to determining the end product of 
acquisition as this theory suggests. Regardless of parentage, children raised 
in an English speaking environment internalize English grammar, while 
children raised in a Chinese environment internalize Chinese grammar. 
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Type H. A second group of acquisition theories are those which fit what 
might be called the Innate Library Model. On theories of this sort, the child 
is viewed as innately having internal representations of every grammar it is 
possible for a human to learn. The representations are complete in every 
detail; each contains all the grammatical information an adult speaker of the 
language would tacitly know. Such theories will also have to postulate an 
innate search mechanism of considerable complexity. What is needed is some 
efficient way of selecting the correct grammar from the mass of incorrect 
ones, on the basis of the relatively limited cues provided by the input to the 
acquisition mechanism. The possible heuristic strategies for seeking the 
correct grammar are limitless in number; some might invoke a system of 
ranking of grammars (and of categories of grammars), others would not. 
There is a distinction to be drawn between two rather different sorts 
of Innate Library Model theories which will play a central role in our later 
argument. The library metaphor suggests a useful first pass at explaining the 
distinction. Imagine two different sort of  libraries: The first sort of library, 
like most libraries, has a wide variety of books, some of which may be 
strikingly similar to each other (e.g., consecutive editions of the same title) 
and some of which have none but the most trivial properties in common 
with the other books in the library. Quite a different sort of library is one 
whose collection is limited to closely related volumes. An extreme case might 
be a library that collected only books with identical first chapters. Another 
example might be a library that specialized in stories of a certain quite 
definite structure with a specific sequence of events, though the characters 
might have different names and the events might take place in different 
places. This distinction between restricted and unrestricted libraries applies 
fairly directly to acquisition theories that fit the Innate Library Model. 
Restricted Library Model theories attribute to the child innate knowledge of 
a class of grammars that have non-trivial properties in common. Unrestricted 
Innate Library Model theories attribute to the child innate knowledge 
of grammars whose only common properties are utterly trivial ones. The 
distinction is hardly a precise one, since I have not said what I take to be 
trivial properties. For the most part, I am content to rely on our shared 
intuitions about which common properties are trivial and which are not. 
But perhaps a few illustrations may serve to sharpen the reader's under- 
standing of what I mean by a 'trivial' common property. Presumably the 
innately known grammars are finite in number. Suppose them to be en- 
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numerated in some arbitrary way. Then each grammar in the library has the 
property of  being identical with the first, or being identical with the second, 
of .... or being identical with the last. This is a paradigm of the sort of  com- 
mon property I am calling 'trivial'. Common properties of this sort can be 
found in any finite set. Another trivial common property might be containing 
no more than n rules, for some suitably large n. For future references, let us 
call unrestricted Innate Library Theories type 11-U theories, and restricted 
Innate Library Theories type 11-R theories. 
I know of no argument against type II theories that is quite as knock- 
down as the argument against type I theories. But still it seems wildly im- 
plausible that a type II acquisition theory could be correct. There are 
thousands of distinct languages known, and no doubt there are thousands 
more humanly possible languages that are not now and never have been 
spoken. Since each language has a distinct grammar, the innate storage 
capacity that would have to be postulated by a type II theory is simply stag- 
gering. 6 So it looks like we will have to look elsewhere for plausible theories 
of language acquisition. 
Type 111. The third group of acquisition theories attributes to the pre- 
linguistic child not an innate library of grammars, but rather an innate 
production system, or set of rules, which generates grammars. Among the 
grammars generated by the rules will be all and only those which can be 
acquired by a human being in the natural way. Perhaps a word of explana- 
tion is in order on the notion of a production system that generates 
grammars. In general terms, a grammar-generating system is analogous 
to a grammar. A grammar is system of rules which generates a large number 
of  symbol sequences; if it is a grammar of English, then each of the symbol 
sequences generated will be (a phonetic representation of) an English 
sentence, and (a phonetic representation of) each English sentence will be 
generated by the grammar. Now a grammar itself is simply sequence of 
symbols, though of course it is a much longer and more complex sequence 
of symbols than most commonplace sentences. So just as there may be a 
system of rules which would generate each English sentence, so too there may 
be a system of rules which would generate each humanly learnable grammar. 
According to type III theories, normal children are born with a grammar- 
generating production system which they exploit in learning the grammar 
they do. 
As with type II theories, type III theories will have to attribute more to 
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the child than merely the innate grammar-generating production system. The 
child will also have to have some very sophisticated heuristic mechanism 
which enables her to exploit sensory input at various points in using the 
production system. Put in another way, the job of the heuristic mechanism 
will be to generate the correct grammar from the production system, using 
the sensory input available to the child as guidance. 7 
The distinction between unrestricted and restricted Innate Library the- 
ories (i.e. between type II-U and type II-R theories) finds an exact analogue 
in Innate Production System theories. There are some production systems 
whose output grammars will all have significant and non-trivial properties 
in common, while other production systems will generate a heterogeneous 
class of grammars whose only common properties are trivial ones. It might 
be thought the very fact that a class of grammars is generated by a given 
production system is sufficient to guarantee that each of the generated 
grammars will share non-trivial properties. But this is not the case. Perhaps 
the simplest way to make the point is this: Suppose we have 17 arbitrarily 
different production systems, each generating a different class of grammars. 
Further, suppose that the first rule of the first production system is of the 
form G1 ~ _ _ ,  the first rule of the second production system is of the 
form G2 ~ - - ,  and the first rule of the 17th production system is of the 
form G17 -+ - - .  Then we can construct a new production system whose 
output class is the union of the output classes of the 17 hypothesized 
systems. We need simply take the first rule to be: s 
G -~ G2 
iG1 , 
Now plainly there is no reason to suppose that an arbitrary grammar 
generated by the 17th production system has any but trivial properties in 
common with an arbitrary generated by the first production system. But both 
of these grammars are generated by our larger production system. So we have 
at least one straightforward example of a grammar-generating production 
system whose output grammars share only trivial properties. More generally, 
there is no more reason to suppose that the output grammars of  a grammar- 
generating production system will have non-trivial properties in common 
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than there is to suppose that the output sentences of a grammar will have 
non-trivial properties in common. Let us call those Innate Production System 
theories whose output grammars share only trivial properties unrestricted 
Innate Production System theories (or type 111-U theories), and let us call 
those whose output grammars share non-trivial properties restricted lnnate 
Productions System (or type 111-R theories). 
Type 1V. The final category of acquisition theory I will mention is a 
variation on type II1 theories. In type III theories we supposed that the child 
was endowed with an innate production system which generated complete, 
fully detailed grammars. Type IV theories, by contrast, attribute to the child 
an innate production system which generates only partially complete gram- 
mars. To fill out the details of the grammar, the child invokes one or another 
essentially empiricist mechanism. Thus, for example, one type IV theory 
might generate grammars which were fully detailed save for not specifying the 
phonetic shape of items in the surface vocabulary. Discovering the phonetic 
shape of surface vocabulary would be relegated to some sort of empiricist 
mechanism which could 'copy' the correct phonetic information from the 
speech the child heard. Of course, like type III theories, type IV theories 
will also have to attribute to the child a sophisticated heuristic mechanism 
whose function is to use environmental input to guide the production system 
in generating the correct output. The boundary between type III and type 
IV theories, like that between type II and type III, is a fuzzy one, and it is 
no trick to imagine acquisition theories which might be counted as either 
type III or type IV. Type IV theories, like type III, can be further divided 
into two sub-types, with the distinction turning on the matter of common 
properties in the class of output grammars. If all the (partially complete) 
grammars generated by a type IV theory have non-trivial properties in 
common, we will call the theory a type IV-R theory; if the output grammars 
share only trivial properties, we will call the theory a type 1V-U theory. 
This completes my brief taxonomy of non-Empiricist theories. I do not 
offer it as a complete catalogue, for no doubt there are quite different sorts 
of non-Empiricist language acquisition theories that might be constructed. 
Rather, my purpose was to point out just how diverse non-Empiricist 
theories can be, and to help us locate the sort of theory Chomsky advocates. 
Just what kind of language acquisition theory does Chomsky think is correct? 
The answer is not entirely clear. In Aspects of  the Theory of  Syntax Chomsky 
insists that "a child who is capable of learning a language must have ... (iii) 
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some initial delimitation of a class of possible hypotheses about language 
structure ... [and] (v) a method for selecting one of the (presumably, 
infinitely many) hypotheses that are allowed by (iii) and are compatible with 
the given primary linguistic data." (p. 30) These remarks, along with most 
everything else that Chomsky has written about theories of language ac- 
quisition are compatible with the proposal that the correct theory will be 
of type III or type IV. Chomsky's remarks do not commit him to a type III 
or type IV theory since he is generally non-committal on just how the "initial 
delimitation of [an infinite] class of possible hypotheses about language 
structure" is to be accomplished. Thus there may be some sort of acquisition 
theory which does not delimit the class of possible output grammars by using 
a production system, but does it instead in some other way. For the sake of 
explicitness, however, I shall in what follows assume that Chomsky would 
expect to find the correct acquisition theory among the type III or type IV 
theories. Little generality is lost here since the point I want to make can 
almost certainly be reconstructed for most any plausible alternative account 
of how the output class of the acquisition theory is specified. 
Theories of types III and IV are surely the most plausible among the 
acquisition theories we have surveyed. Thus I have no quarrel with Chomsky's 
view that the correct theory is to be found here. However, Chomsky also 
insists that the correct theory will be a restricted or type R theory, and it is 
here that my dissent is focused. Chomsky insists that an explanatorily 
adequate linguistic theory 
incorporates an account of linguistic universals, and attributes tacit knowledge of these 
universals to the child. It proposes, then, that the child approaches the data with the 
presumption that they are drawn from a language of a certain antecedently well-defined 
type, his problem being to determine which of the (humanly) possible languages is that 
of the community in which he is placed. Language learning would be impossible unless 
this were the case. (Aspects, p. 27). 
Moreover, it is clear from what Chomsky says in the following text and in 
many other places that the universals he is speaking of are non-trivial ones. 
In particular, he is plainly claiming more than that all humanly possible 
grammars share the common property of being generated by some particular 
grammar-generating production system. So Chomsky is committed to the 
claim that the output class of the acquisition mechanism, i.e. the class of 
'humanly possible grammars', will exhibit non-trivial common properties. 
Now the problem with this claim is that it is entirely undefended. Chomsky 
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does not offer any serious empirical evidence for the existence of non-trivial 
linguistic universals .9 The arguments he does offer are versions of the rational 
scientist argument. But this argument at best establishes that an acquisition 
theory must be non-Empiricist. It is irrelevant to the question of linguistic 
universals unless it is assumed that any non-Empiricist theory must postulate 
linguistic universals. And as we have seen, that is simply false. Type III-U 
and type IV-U theories are clearly non-Empiricist, though neither category 
of theory insists that all humanly possible grammars exhibit non-trivial 
universal features. 
Perhaps the most striking symptom of Chomsky's failure to note the 
logical space separating non-Empiricist learning theories from the doctrine 
of linguistic universals is his fondness for a curious form of argument. When 
arguing that one or another feature of a grammar is in fact universal to 
human grammars, Chomsky often will rest his case on the observation that 
the feature in question could not have been learned by the child. To show 
that it could not be learned, he points out that there are numerous alternative 
logically possible grammars which lack the putatively universal feature but 
which are compatible with all the evidence available to the child. Since the 
child acquires a grammar which exhibits the feature, Chomsky argues, the 
feature must be universal. ~~ Now it takes relatively little to see that the 
conclusion in Chomsky's argument is simply a non-sequator. From the fact 
that the evidence available to the child is compatible with grammars not 
exhibiting the putatively universal feature, we might plausibly conclude 
that the acquisition mechanism itself is heavily implicated in the explanation 
of the fact that the child acquires a grammar exhibiting the feature. But it 
is quite another matter to claim that the feature is universal among the 
possible outputs of the acquisition mechanism. For Chomsky's argument 
to be at all plausible in establishing this latter conclusion, we should have to 
assume not only that there are linguistic universals, but also that most (or all) 
of the features of grammars which are unlearned (i.e. which the child (or the 
rational scientist) cannot inductively discover from the evidence available) 
are universal features. 
It might be though that the universality of unlearned features could be 
established as follows: 
Since the evidence available to the child is compatible with alternative (logically possible) 
grammars which do not exhibit the feature in question, nothing in the data can tell the 
acquisition mechanism to choose a grammar with the feature rather than a grammar 
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without it. The fact that the acquisition mechanism does select a grammar with the 
feature can only be explained if we assume that it has no choice, because all of its 
possible outputs have the feature. 
However, this argument turns on a confusion. In granting that the child's 
evidence is compatible with alternative logically possible grammars not 
exhibiting the feature, we are surely not granting that "nothing in the data 
can tell acquisition mechanism to choose a grammar with the feature rather 
than a grammar without it". We are granting only that nothing in the data 
lends inductive support to the choice of  one grammar over the other. Put 
more vividly, we are granting that the rational scientist would be unable to 
select between a pair of  grammars, one exhibiting the feature and one not,  
solely on the basis of  that data available to the child. But the acquisition 
device need not be similarly indecisive. Its decisions are not constrained by 
the cannons of  inductive reasoning. They may turn on some quite arbitrary 
aspect o f  the available data, an aspect which the scientist would rightly view 
as evidentially irrelevant to the choice confronting him. Thus, to conjure 
a slightly outlandish example, it might be that the acquisition device outputs 
17 quite distinct categories of  grammars and that the members of  only one of  
these categories, say the 13th, exhibit a certain abstract structural feature. 
The heuristic mechanism, in turn, might be innately programmed to restrict 
its search to category 13 if and only if, say, the word commonly used for a 
certain shade of  red in the child's linguistic community is polysylabic. Plainly 
the argument we have been reviewing lends no support to the claim that un- 
learned features of  a grammar need be universal. 
Thus far I have argued that an attack on Empiricist acquisition theories 
is no defense o f  the doctrine of  linguistic universals. Before concluding let 
us ponder just what sort of  defense that latter doctrine might receive. The 
most obvious sort of  evidence to be sought for the claim that all humanly 
possible languages share common features would come from an exhaustive 
survey of  extant languages. If  we find non-trivial common features in the 
grammars o f  large numbers o f  diverse languages (and, of  course, if we find no 
language whose grammar lacks the feature in question) then we have some 
serious evidence for the claim that there are linguistic universals. But in 
syntax and semantics, at least, it seems dubious that any such evidence 
will be in the offing soon, since there is precious little agreement about what 
the correct generative grammar of  even the most carefully studied languages 
will look like. 
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Even if there were considerable evidence that grammars of diverse languages 
exhibit common features, there are two masons to be suspicious of the 
inference to the doctrine of  linguistic universals. The first, a point noted by 
Hilary Putnam, 11 is that even if all extant languages exhibit non-trivial 
common properties, there are explanations that could be offered for this fact 
which would not trace the common properties to features of the innate 
language acquisition mechanism. It might, for example, be the case that all 
extant languages were descended from a single common ur-language whose 
details have been lost in pre-history. If  so, then we might expect to find 
common properties in extant languages, though these properties need not be 
exhibited by all humanly possible languages. Thus the extant languages might 
prove to be a relatively uncharacteristic sample of  the humanly possible 
languages, exhibiting only a small part of the possible diversity in humanly 
possible languages. The second reason to be suspicious of the inference from 
common properties in extant languages to the doctrine of linguistic universals 
tums on how grammars are verified. Like other empirical theories, grammars 
are massively undetermined by the evidence we can garner for them. Given 
one grammar that can handle a body of data, it is no trick to produce many 
others that can handle the same data equally well. In an effort to reduce this 
empirical underdetermination, grammarians adopt the obvious strategy of 
opting for that grammar which, among all those that are compatible with the 
data, most closely resembles the best grammars we have for other languages. 
Plainly, however, this strategy has great potential for generating specious 
universals, since if we can write a grammar exhibiting a feature common to 
grammars for other languages, then we will do so, even if the data available 
for the language at hand cannot distinguish between the grammar we write 
and others that do not exhibit the 'universal' feature.12 
There is, of course, another and quite different strategy that might be 
adopted in attempting to confirm the existence of linguistic universals. 
To show that a feature is universal to humanly possible languages we need 
only demonstrate that languages failing to exhibit the feature are not 
learnable as first languages by human children. But if this is the best test of 
the universals hypotheses, then it is to be hoped that the best test will never 
be performed. 
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NOTES 
1 See, for example, [Aspects] Ch. 1, [Language] Ch. 3, [Reflections] Chs. 1 and 4. 
2 Cf. my [WESK], [GPI] and [G&I], also Schwartz [Knowing], and Cooper [Knowl- 
edge]. For my current view on the topic of 'tacit knowledge' of. [Beliefs]. 
Cf. Chomsky's [Reflections] pp. 198ff. and the references given there. 
4 This talk of 'Empiricist' theories of mind and learning rests on the assumption that 
there are interesting family resemblances among Classical Empiricist theories of mind 
and modern learning theories in the behaviorist tradition. For example, both Classical 
Empiricism and recent behaviorist learning theory characteristically attribute to the 
mind an innate learning mechanism which is relatively simple, imposes relatively little 
structure on the output of the learning process, and is neither species nor task specific. 
Similarly, there are important family resemblances among Classical Rationalist theories 
of mind and the sort of learning theory advocated by Chomsky and his followers. For 
more on this theme, see Chomsky [Cartesian], [Language] ch. 1, and [Reflections] 
pp. 217ff. 
5 Perhaps a word is in order on the 'bit more'. The investigator presumably brings with 
him some cognitive mechanism that enables him to think up hypotheses. Empiricist 
account of mind, however, are generally quite uniformative about the process of 
hypothesis formation. Beyond the strategy of generalization and extrapolation, they 
have few suggestions on how we actually come up with an hypothesis to test. But this 
leaves the Empiricist with no substantive theory about how we discover the vast 
majority of serious scientific hypotheses. Often enough Empiricist theorists will be quite 
open about the deficiency, relegating the problem to the psychology of imagination or 
some similar domain. 
Let me add important caveat. Certain type II-R theories might actually have relatively 
modest needs for innate storage. Thus suppose all humanly possible languages have 
grammars which are identical save for a few details. - The analogy is the library 
specializing in books which differ only in the final chapter. - If this were true, then it 
would be relatively easy to store tens of thousands of grammars, since the redundant 
information need only be recorded once. 
7 Although paradigm cases of type II theories will be readily distinguishable from 
paradigm cases of type III theories, the boundary between the two types of theories is not 
all that sharp. Many sorts of acquisition theories might be constructed which straddle the 
divide between the two types. As an example, consider the type II-R theory outlined in 
Note 6. Here we have a sort of primitive production system which specifies the core of 
rules shared by all the grammars, as in the Library Model, then lists a number of different 
variations each of which, appended to the core rules, yields a complete grammar. 
8 I.e. G may be rewritten as G 1 , or as G2, ..., or as G17. 
9 For an interesting discussion of some putative examples of universals along with a 
critique of the 'evidence' for them, see Cooper [Knowledge] Chapter 9. 
1o Chomsky has invokded instances of this argument on many occasions. Here is an 
example from his recent Reflections on Language (Pantheon Books, New York, 1975). 
Chomsky begins with a definition of 'universal grammar'. "Let us define 'universal 
grammar' (UG) as the system of principles, conditions, and rules that are dements or 
properties of all human languages not merely by accident but by necessity - of course, 
I mean biological, not logical, necessity. Thus UG can be taken as expressing 'the essence 
of human language'. UG will be invariant among humans. UG will specify what language 
learning must achieve, if it takes place successfully. Thus UG will be a significant com- 
ponent of LT (H, L), ['LT (H, L)' has previously been det'med as (p. 28) "the system of 
mechanisms and principles put to work in acquisition of knowledge of language".] What 
is learned, the cognitive structure attained, must have the properties of UG, though it 
will have other properties as well, accidental properties. If we were to construct a 
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language violating UG, we would find that it could not be learned by LG (H, L). That is, 
it would not be learnable under normal conditions of access and exposure to data." 
(p. 29) A page later Chomsky tells us: "We can gain some insight into UG, hence LT 
(H,L), whenever we find properties of language that  can be reasonably supposed not to 
have been learned." (p. 30) He then spends several pages establishing that in processing 
declarative sentences an English speaker invokes a 'structure-dependent' rule. The next step 
is to ask why. "... The scientist must ask why it is that the child unerringly makes use of the 
structure-dependent rule postulated in hypothesis 2, rather than the simpler structure- 
independent rule of hypothesis 1. There seems to be no explanation in terms of 'com- 
municative efficiency' or similar considerations. It is certainly absurd to argue that 
children are trained to use the structure-dependent rule, in this case. In fact, the problem 
never arises in language learning. A person may go through a considerable part of his 
life without ever facing relevant evidence, but he will have no hesitation in using the 
structure-dependent rule, even if all of his experience is consistent with hypothesis 1. 
The only reasonable conclusion is that UG contains the principle that all such rules must 
be structure-dependent. That is, the child's mind (specifically its component LT (H, L)) 
contains the instruction: construct a structure-dependent rule, ignoring all structure 
independent rules. The principle of structure-dependence is not learned, but forms part 
of the conditions for language learning." (pp. 3 2 - 3 )  The final step in Chomsky's argu- 
ment is to infer the universality of structure-dependence. "To corroborate this con- 
clusion about UG (hence about LT (H, L)), the scientist will ask whether other rules 
of English are invariably structure-dependent. So far as we know the answer is 
positive .... Having gotten this far, the scientist will conclude that other languages must 
have the same property, on the assumption that humans are not specifically designed to 
learn one rather than another language, say English rather than Japanese. On this 
reasonable assumption, the principle of structure-dependence.., must hold universally 
if it holds for English." (p. 33) 
11 In [Innateness]. 
12 For more on this theme, cf. my [GPI] and [C&I]. 
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